Dignity

From Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 7 (1992), by Panagiotis Kondylis and Viktor Pöschl.

In contemporary philosophical, political, theological and legal debates, the concept of (human) dignity is ubiquitous. A lot can be said thirty-two years after this entry was published¹; nevertheless, since the philosophical and political aspects are scrutinised in the following entry, I shall dedicate a few words regarding its contemporary religious-theological and juridical sense.

Theologically, it is most discussed within Catholicism. Human dignity began being popularised by Pope Leo XIII in the “Libertas” encyclical, but became used by the general public after World War II; “Libertas” later influenced “Pacem In Terris” encyclical of Pope John XXIII, which in its turn influenced the 1965 “Dignitatis humanae”² encyclical. In Pope John Paul II’s Catechism of the Catholic Church, there is a specific chapter concerning the dignity of the human person³. Catholic personalism is, for all intents and purposes, a part of the Church’s official doctrine, ready for the imprimatur stamp. On that note, in 2018, Pope Francis considered the death penalty to be inadmissible, revising the Catechism’s paragraph 2267, based on human dignity. There are hundreds of references in the current papacy regarding human dignity, the most well-known perhaps being Fratelli Tutti, mentioning the concept sixty-six times. As an anecdote, human dignity has become a word for polemical use to “speak out against transgenderism”; not that the complete opposite doesn’t also exist.

In a juridical sense, most contemporary constitutions⁴ ground the State on the concept of human dignity — independently of recognition by a given political community, it is a prius which all must respect (sadly, not constituted through open and equal dialogue in Habermasian fashion; a real blow to Häberles’ open society of constitutional interpreters). The ambiguity of the term is praised for its malleability; but upon closer inspection, whether formally or materially, it is either inapplicable or too vague to be invoked. It is a kind of naturalistic fallacy, deriving an Ought (certain inalienable, absolute rights) from an Is (a person being/existing). The coeval State bases itself on an empty formula, as Kondylis acutely concludes.

Lastly, in regards to the text and its translation, I have maintained 2 of the 249 footnotes. After painstakingly going through every Ancient and Medieval (and some of the German idealism) sources presented in the text, I have, in true mass-democratic fashion, added a translation to passages in Latin which aren’t present in the original, to facilitate the reader’s study. I would still like to draw attention to the footnotes I added: some contextualise the text, others bring new aspects unmentioned in it.

---

Dignity

I. 'Dignity' in ancient Rome. II. 'Dignitas' in medieval theology. III. The socio-political use of 'dignitas' and 'dignity' until the dissolution of the societas civilis. IV. 'Dignitas hominis' in the Renaissance and Reformation. V. 'Dignitas' in Natural Law. VI. The Western European and German Enlightenment's debate on human dignity. VII. The degradation and revival of the concept of dignity in the 19th century. VIII. Outlook.

I. 'Dignity' in ancient Rome. 

‘Dignity’ (‘dignitas’) is initially a political concept in Rome. Membership of the nobility, official function, services to the community, but also dignity of appearance, manner of expression and lifestyle are essential elements of Roman dignitas. Its splendour is one of the peculiarities of the Roman way of life. Leading politicians have a personal claim to dignity, recognition and consideration that would seem not only arrogant but absurd in our world. Thus CAESAR, as he explicitly states several times, wages civil war for the sake of his dignitas. At the end of the Gallic campaigns, his military command is to be taken from him so that he can be tried for unlawful acts. He cannot accept this. Before the outbreak of hostilities, he declares in a message to Pompey, sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque potiorem (the dignity and life [of the republic] had always been his first priority). His opponents do not dispute this claim⁵, but they call on him to give it a different interpretation. According to his dignity, he must put his personal interests aside in favour of the community⁶: Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut cum illis nocere se speret, rei publicae noceat (Caesar, too, for his own dignity, ought to let go of his zeal and anger for the cause of the republic, and not to be so bitterly angry with his enemies as to injure the republic in the hope that he is injuring them). Caesar's behaviour is no exception; CICERO and even Catilina fight for their dignitas. Antony declares himself ready to obey the Senate, sed ita, ut teneat dignitatem (but in such a way as to keep his dignity). It is inconceivable that a politician today could base his behaviour so pronouncedly on his dignity. Two elements of our attitude to life and society forbid such behaviour: Christian humility and democratic égalité. For us, the fundamental equality of all citizens before the law, indeed of all people, is a self-evident matter. For the Romans of the Republic, dignitas tied to the person was an equally indisputable reality.

In ancient Greece, too, there is nothing that corresponds exactly to the Roman concept, although some aspects of the meaning of Roman ‘dignitas’ have incorporated Greek elements. There is no Greek word that corresponds to ‘dignitas’ in meaning, luminosity and frequency. Ἀξίᾱ, άξίωμα in the sense of ‘dignity’, ‘prestige’, ‘reputation’ are rare in older usage, but in later usage they are already partly influenced by the Roman ‘dignitas’. Where PLATO speaks of the dignity (ἀξίωμα) of Athens, he means the fame of the Attic spirit. In Rome, on the other hand, political achievement is a main prerequisite for dignitas. Although noble birth alone confers dignity, it is itself directly linked to the res publica. There is no member of the nobility whose ancestors did not serve the community, and the dignity inherited must also be proven anew in the service of the res publica. There is no political dignitas without a higher office and without membership of the senate. At the same time, we must not overlook the sacred element that has characterised the dignity of Roman office-holders since time immemorial. ‘Sanctus senatus’ is the official designation, even in later times.

However, the degree of dignitas was originally measured neither by origin nor by office, but by individual political achievement. If the achievement is present, then it implies a claim that can be asserted with determination and used as a legitimate argument in the political struggle, a claim of the person that stands on an equal footing with the claim of the res publica. The statements of Roman orators and historians are revealing, where person and res publica appear side by side as obligatory norms, with the person usually being mentioned first. Thus CAESAR, on the occasion of the negotiations with Ariovist, speaks of quod in tanto imperio popul Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur (because he thought that the Roman people were most turpid⁷ to themselves and to the state in such an empire), when the Germanic prince enslaves the Aedui, brother and blood relatives of Rome. In a letter to Brutus, CICERO praises the behaviour of the addressee: Facis ex tua dignitate et ex re publica (You do it by force of your dignity and of the republic).

The term ‘dignity’ is closely related to other Roman concepts of value that describe the prestige of the person: ‘auctoritas’ (= ‘authority’), ‘gratia’ (= ‘claim to gratitude’, which the client owes to the patron and the people to the statesman), ‘fides’ (= ‘obligation of loyalty’ of both the powerful and the follower). While the term ‘fides’ implies performance and consideration in almost the same way, ‘auctoritas’, ‘gratia’ and ‘dignitas’ emphasise more strongly the claim of the powerful to allegiance, although the obligation to the res publica is tacitly assumed. Although not interchangeable, these terms overlap, and as important as it is to distinguish their meaning, it remains to be said that they are only different aspects of the same political phenomenon, the unusual power of the individual, the never-questioned prestige of the principes rei publicae.

The power of the individual in Rome can only be appreciated if one understands the royal position of the leading members of the nobility. The power of the patronage played a decisive role in this. The victorious Roman lords used to take allied cities and countries into their personal protection, and this patronage remained with their dynasty. Thus the Claudians had Sparta and Pergamon as clients, received their envoys and represented their wishes in the senate. ‘Nowhere in the world has such political patronage been united in the hands of individual, formally purely private families. Long before all monarchy there existed private powers of rulership, such as otherwise only monarchs possess.’ The unchallenged validity of the concept of “dignity” and related concepts presupposes voluntary recognition by the community. The relationship of the individual to the community is always implied; entitlement and obligation are inextricably linked. Thus, dignity is constantly redefined through recognition by the community, whereby the censor, as the authorised representative of the community, is the constitutional authority that watches over the dignity of the senators. It is expected that the performance is recognised accordingly. In other words, a high degree of solidarity, unity, political and social discipline is required. This points to the broader phenomenon that the Romans succeeded in keeping alive the standards of an older aristocratic stage of development and the functioning of a collective morality in the political power play over a remarkably long period of time. The strong emphasis on the personal element was not an achievement of the late Republic, which was influenced by Hellenism, but a basic element and a main prerequisite of Roman greatness. Roman dignity can be seen as an expression of the hierarchical structure of Roman society. Nevertheless, there is nothing rigid about it; it is dynamic and flexible. Just as access to the nobility was always open to newcomers who proved themselves — which, of course, was rare enough — so dignity was always in flux. It establishes a claim to power that is not immovable; it can be defended, increased, diminished, lost and restored.

CICERO already missed the consideration of dignitas among the Greeks. Of Athenian democracy he says: Quoniam distinctos dignitatis gradus non habebant, non tenebat ornatum suum civitas (Since they did not have distinct degrees of dignity, the city did not keep its ornament [=honor]). For the Romans, a political and social order that does not recognise clear gradations is inconceivable. This goes so far that omnibus, qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auzerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur (to all who have preserved their country, helped them, and told them that there is a definite place in heaven, where the blessed will forever enjoy). 

Dignitas is not just a privilege, but an obligatory norm, and this brings us to its moral side. Whoever lays claim to dignitas must practise self-discipline. He must conquer the animalistic and emotional in himself. This above all makes the concept of dignity an element of Roman self-consciousness and the Roman feeling of superiority, an essential characteristic of Roman behaviour and Roman style. Roman dignitas requires generosity. The ‘minima non curat praetor’ is a characteristic of Roman dignity. Jurisprudence dealing with quisquilia (minute details) lacks this: Dignitas in tam tenus scientia non potest esse; res enim sunt parvae, prope in singulis litteris atque interpunctionibus verborum occupatae ([there can be] no dignity in so limited a science; for they are but small matters, conversant chiefly about single letters and punctuation between words). Philosophical writing also contradicts Roman dignitas, a reproach against which Cicero must defend himself: Aliquos futuros suspicor qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent (I suspect there will be some who will wish to divert me to other fields of author­ship, asserting that this kind of composition, though a graceful recreation, is beneath the dignity of my character and position). CAESAR does not consider it worthy of his and the Roman people's dignity to cross the Rhine in ships: Sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat (but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people). Here we summarise the attitude that gave rise to the astonishing Roman utility buildings, bridges, roads and aqueducts. 

“Higher sense (Hoher Sinn)”, “magnitudo animi”, is inseparable from Roman dignity, which thus incorporates conceptual elements of Greek megalopsychia. Magnanimous is he, says ARISTOTELES, who considers himself worthy of great things and is also worthy (ἄξιος) of them … Magnanimity has to do with great things. But more than that, Roman willfulness and masculine self-control characterise the Roman concept of ‘dignity’. One of the greatest testimonies to Roman dignitas is Caesar's speech in SALLUST, in which he rejects the death penalty for the Catilinarians. With great emphasis, he asserts that dignity and anger are incompatible. Dignity demands the elimination of emotional elements in decision-making. At the same time, it obliges us to generously disregard the demands of strict law. Dignity is not in contradiction to humanitas, but includes it. Here it is stated more clearly than anywhere else that leniency also requires strength. Rome's moderate behaviour against the apostate Rhodes after the subjugation of Macedonia in 168 BC and in its warfare against Carthage in the first two Punic wars are cited as examples of Roman dignity. The request for the death penalty is un-Roman. Similarly, CICERO rejects the death penalty as un-Roman in the Rabirius speech: Mentio ipsa denique indigna cive Romano atque homine libero est (The very mention, finally, is unworthy of a Roman citizen and a free man). Here we are already very close to the term ‘human dignity’ (Menschenwürde), with the restriction characteristic of antiquity, however, that it only refers to free man.

‘Dignitas' is thus a Roman concept of life that is at home in the political sphere and has a strong moral colouring. There is also an aesthetic element. Roman dignitas cannot be separated from representation; it is evident in the outward appearance, in the toga, the insignia of rank of the dignitaries, in the large crowd of clients who accompany the Roman to the forum, in gesture and posture, clothing and lifestyle, in the representative works of Roman art, especially Roman state architecture. In the preface to his work on architecture, VITRUVIUS mentions that Augustus was not only interested in achieving world domination, but ut civitas per te non solum provinciis esset aucta, verum etiam ut maiestas imperis publicorum aedificiorum egregias haberet auctoritates (that by you the city might not only be increased by provinces, but also that the majesty of the government of the public buildings might have auctoritas [=socially recognised knowledge]). The word ‘maiestas’ used here refers to the sovereignty (Souveränität) of the Roman people and the ruler⁸. It has a flavour of splendour and greatness. It is, as it were, a heightened dignitas. When the praetorians invade the imperial palace in the Year of the Four Emperors⁹, AD 69, to arrest the senators sitting there at the banquet — for they feared an attack on the emperor Otho — he jumps onto the cushion of a dining sofa contra decus imperii, whereby ‘decus’ here, as elsewhere, is often a synonym for ‘dignitas’.

Roman state and sacral ceremonial is characterised by solemnity and dignity. The pictorial representations of Roman state ceremonies illustrate this most vividly. Here, too, the difference to the Greek is striking: the measured dignity of the Ara Pacis contrasts with the relaxed grace of the Parthenon frieze.

Dignitas is a Roman stylistic principle in a comprehensive sense. It also plays a role in the narrower field of rhetoric. The Auctor ad Herennium, the anonymous author of the oldest surviving Latin manual of rhetoric (written around 88-85 BC), mentions dignity in his treatment of the manner of delivery: Sermo dividitur in partes quattuor: dignitatem, demonstrationem, narrationem, tocationem. Dignitas est oratio cum aliqua gravitate et vocis remissione (The sermon [=speech] is divided into four parts: the Dignified, the Explicative, the Narrative, and the Facetious. The Dignified, or Serious, Tone of Conversation is marked by some degree of impressiveness and by vocal restraint).

An essential element of ancient artistic speech, which is also perceived as a musical structure to an extent that we can no longer imagine, is rhythm. CICERO therefore explains which rhythm has dignity and which does not. He turns against those speakers who pay no attention to dignity. Jokes can be particularly detrimental to dignity: Parcebat enim adversarii dignitati, in quo ipse conservabat suam (for he was wary of the dignity of his opponent, and in that respect maintained his own). For the same reason, Livy censures laughter and jokes that he found in the Greek tradition. Everything that is buffoonish, artificial, offending the measure, everything that is low, malicious, tasteless, in short, everything that is not compatible with our concept of ‘dignity’ contradicts Roman dignitas. Even the stilted and stiff are detrimental to it. It must be associated with grace, and it must appear natural. Agere cum dignitate ac venustate (to act with dignity and grace), demands CICERO. Here, then, we have the pair of terms that we encounter in Schiller's treatise on ‘Anmut und Würde’ (1793), which is rich in antitheses.

Although the term ‘dignity’ remains linked to the public sphere here as well, its aesthetic and moral use is nevertheless beginning to detach it from the political. The prerequisite for this was that ‘dignitas’ was increasingly devalued in the political sphere, that the term became a mere buzzword on the one hand and a technical term for higher offices on the other. The development towards terminological consolidation found its expression in late antiquity in the notitia dignitatum, a list of military and political dignitaries in the west and east of the empire after the establishment of the Diocletian prefectural order (Tetrarchy). Nevertheless, the distinction between ‘office’ and ‘dignity’ was never completely lost, as Cicero formulated in a letter to his brother: Sit lictor non suae [saevitiae] sed tuae lenitatis apparitor, maioraque praeferant fasces illi ac secures dignitatis insignia quam potestatis (Let the lictor be the dispenser of your clemency, not his own; and let the fasces and axes which they carry before you constitute ensigns rather of dignity¹⁰ than of power). The strange thing, however, is that despite the decline of the Roman state order and the devaluation of ‘dignitas’ associated with it, the transformation of the political concept into a moral one and the detachment from the community that we can observe with many other concepts — with ‘gloria’, ‘honour’, ‘honestus’, ‘generosus’, ‘libertas’, ‘virtus’ — does not occur to the same extent with ‘dignitas’. Thus the step from political dignitas to inner dignity and human dignity - e.g. in Seneca, where one would most likely expect this - has not been taken. This may be due to the fact that the term ‘dignitas’ was increasingly reserved for political offices in the imperial era with its ever stricter and more rigid hierarchy.

However, important beginnings of the development of inner dignity can be found in Cicero. Here lies the root of the modern concept of ‘human dignity’, and strangely enough this has not been observed before. Firstly, it is important that the philosophers' dispute about the aims of life is formulated for the first time in Cicero as a contrast between “voluptas” and “dignitas”: Voluptatem, ... si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror ... dignitati (If pleasure were to speak in its own defense, and it did not have such skillful lawyers to help it, it would confess to being defeated by someone worth more than itself¹¹). The Greek term ‘virtue’ is here exemplified by the Roman concept of life ‘dignitas’, which includes self-control and renunciation of all softness. But the pair of terms ‘useful’ and ‘good’ can also be rendered as ‘utilitas’ and ‘dignitas’: Ergo in suadendo nihil est optabidius quam dignitas; nam qui utilitatem petit, non quid maxime velit suasor sed quid interdum magis sequatur videt. Nemo est enim, … quin putet expetendam maxime dignitatem, sed vincit utilitas plerumque cum subest ille timor ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri (For persuading, then, nothing is more desirable than dignity; for he who thinks that expediency is more desirable, does not consider what the counsellor chiefly wishes, but what he prefers upon occasion to follow; and there is no man … who does not think that dignity ought chiefly to be regarded; but expediency commonly prevails, there being a concealed fear, that even worth cannot be supported if expediency is digregarded). ‘Utilitas’ and ‘dignitas’ also coincide with regard to the form of speech. Cicero explains this in his treatment of rhythms. The musical beauty that the speech acquires through the rhythmic structure and its skilful arrangement is ultimately based on the necessity of pauses for breath. Thus the same law can be observed in artistic speech as in the order of the universe, in the form of man and other living beings, where dignitas and utilitas also converge: Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibili ter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata, sic in oratione, ut ea quae maximam utilitatem in se continerent eadem haberent plurimum vel dignitatis vel saepe etiam venustatis (But as in most things, so in language, Nature herself has wonderfully contrived, that what carries in it the greatest utility, should have at the same time either the most dignity, or, as it often happens, the most beauty). The exposition culminates in an example from the aesthetic realm: the shape of porticoes and temple pediments is also determined by practical necessities. The pediments are there to allow rainwater to run off. But utilitatem fastigii templi dignitas consecuta est, ut etiamsi in caelo capitolium statueretur ubi imber esse non posset, nullam sine fastigio dignitatem habiturum fuisse videatur (Pillars support temples and porticoes, and yet they have not only utility but also dignity. It was not regard to beauty, but necessity, that contrived the pediment of the Capitol, and other buildings; for when a plan was contemplated by which the water might run off from each side of the roof, the dignity of the pediment was added to the utility of the temple; but in such a manner, that should the Capitol be built in heaven, where no rain can fall, it would appear to have no dignity without the pediment).

Most significant for the history of the concept of ‘human dignity’ is the definition of human nature in CICERO's ‘De officiis’, from which he develops the doctrine of duties: Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat; illae nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu, hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiam, si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior,… occultat et dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecundiam. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia… Atque etiam, si considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria (But it is pertinent to every question of office [duty] that we keep before our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts; they feel nothing but pleasure and are driven towards it with every impulse, but the mind of man is nourished by learning and thinking, it is always either enquiring, or doing something, and is led by the pleasure of seeing and hearing. And moreover, if he is a little too susceptible to the attractions of pleasure, … he hides and disguises his desire for it because of shame. From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the dignity of man … And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury [and voluptuousness]).

Here for the first time we come across the term ‘human dignity’. ‘Dignitas’ here denotes the rank of man in the cosmos. This usage arises quite naturally from the Roman term. Because it denotes an elevated position within the Roman polity, it can be applied to the elevated position of man in the cosmos. What is decisively new, however, is that all people now fundamentally possess dignity, precisely because they are human beings. Like the dignitas of the principes rei publicae, man’s outstanding position, his human dignity, is primarily perceived as an obligation. 

We also find a related description of man's destiny in other writings by Cicero following the philosophy of the Middle Stoa (Panaetius and Poseidonius). The purpose of man is to order the world, to create a second nature in the first, the human in the divine, nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alteram naturam efficere (lastly, by means of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world within the world of nature). Man must follow the divine order, as Posidonius put it. In the summarising reflection on the value of philosophising, it says at the end of Cicero's first book ‘On the Laws’: Nam qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid se habere sentiet divinum ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit tantoque munere deorum semper dignum aliquid et faciet et sentiet (For he who knows himself will first feel that he has something divine, and will think of himself as an image dedicated to him, and will always do and feel something worthy of such a function of the gods).

Cicero thus draws not only on the middle Stoa, but ultimately on PLATO himself, for whom correct knowledge was the precondition for the fulfilment of man's destiny. Man must endeavour to become like God; God has assigned him a watch-post which he must not leave, and he has given him the upright posture and the heavenly gaze which elevate him above the animals. These are important starting points for the later definitions of man's destiny and his dignity. However, while in Plato's work, the human being is primarily perfected by turning towards God and the divine cosmos, the Romans and even the middle Stoa emphasised the vita activa more strongly, thus coming closer to the appealing character of Roman dignitas.

In late antiquity, BOETHIUS follows on from the ideas of Platonic-Stoic philosophy, as expressed above all by Cicero: God genus humanum terrenis omnibus praestare voluit, vos dignitatem vestram infra infima quaeque detruditis... Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est (His will was that mankind should excel all things on earth. Ye thrust down your worth beneath the lowest of things. Indeed, man is so constituted that he then only excels other things when he knows himself; but he is brought lower than the beasts if he lose this self-knowledge). It is the ‘humanae naturae condicio’ — an expression that appears again and again in the same context — that it only surpasses everything else when it recognises itself, but sinks below the animals when it ceases to recognise itself. Self-knowledge in the sense of recognising man's destiny is, as with Cicero, the prerequisite for the fulfilment of human dignity.

The Platonic-Stoean definition of human dignity had already penetrated Christianity before, for example in GREGOR OF NYSSA's ‘De hominis opificio’. Following the account of the creation of man, it says there: ‘The soul shows its royal and sublime nature, separated from the common baseness, already in the fact that it is independent and autonomous, acting autonomously according to its own decisions. To whom else is this proper if not to a king? The likeness to the divine nature that rules over everything consists in nothing other than that our nature is created as a king. The makers of images of princes imitate the form of the king and indicate the royal dignity (ἀξία) through the moulding. Thus human nature, which was endowed with dominion over everything else, is set up as a living image through its resemblance to the king of the universe, which has both dignity (ἀξία) and name in common with the archetype.

That ORIGENES (185-253) already spoke of ‘dignity’ in the same context is possible, but by no means certain, although the Latin translations of the lost Greek originals, e.g. of HIERONYMUS, use the word ‘dignitas’: Aut scito quia si te non cognoveris et tuam nescieris dignitatem, patieris haec quae sequuntur (Or know that if you do not know yourself and do not know your dignity, you will suffer these things that follow). One must be careful with inferences. The most important translators, Jerome and Rufinus, have accused each other of handling the original too freely. There is no doubt that we have to reckon with a not insignificant degree of Romanisation.

In Cicero, the dignity of man is derived from his rank within the world order. In the process, the Platonic likeness of man to God merges with the Christian likeness. Through the creation of man, dignity was conferred on him, through the fall into sin it was lost, through the incarnation of Christ it was restored, and even today the sacrificial prayer of the Mass reads: ‘God, who hast marvellously established the dignity of human substance’ (Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti). The prayer probably goes back to Pope LEO THE GREAT (440-461), who repeatedly offers evidence of ‘dignitas’ in the sense of ‘human dignity’ in his sermons: Expergiscere, o homo, et dignitatem tuae cognosce naturae. Recordare te factum ad imaginem Dei; quae, etsi in Adam corrupta, in Christo tamen est reformata (Awake, O man, and know the dignity of your nature. Remember that you were made in the image of God; which, though corrupted in Adam, was yet reformed in Christ). Inveniemus hominem ideo ad imaginem Dei conditum, ut imitator sui esset auctoris; et hanc esse naturalem nostri generis dignitatem, si in nobis quasi in quodam speculo divinae benignitatis forma resplendeat (We shall therefore find man created in the image of God, that he might be an imitator of his author; and that this is the natural dignity of our race, if it shines in us as in a kind of mirror of divine kindness). In AUGUSTINE (357-430) dignitas is found in the same sense only once, when the best robe that the Father puts on the prodigal son is explained allegorically as the renewal of the dignity that Adam lost: Stola prima est dignitas quam perdidit Adam (The stola is the first dignity that Adam lost).

VIKTOR PÖSCHL

II. 'Dignitas' in medieval theology. 

Like early Christian theology, medieval theology also based its concept of dignitas on the doctrine of the image of God. This continuity is not surprising. For the doctrine of the image of God was one link in an antithetical pair of concepts, which as a whole was indispensable for church ideology. In other words, man as the image and likeness of God represented the unthinkable flip side of man as the author and victim of the Fall of Man. If the image of God guaranteed the future redemption of man, the reference to his sinfulness served to justify the present necessity of more or less ascetic discipline. Discipline was to take place anyway in view of the assumed sinfulness, but ultimately it could only find its plausible or comforting justification in the hope of redemption — a redemption that was considered certain not only thanks to the effect of grace, but also because man, as the image of God, seemed to carry the beginnings of it ontologically within himself. This scale of thought explains why the image of God and the sinfulness of man were equally indispensable for the church: both contributed in a complementary way to underpinning its claim to education and rule. 

These contexts must be taken into account in order to understand the persistence with which dignitas is spoken of before or after gloomy statements about the present state of man; the ontologically given human dignitas thus attains its full glory precisely from the contrast to the abject dignitas thus attains its full glory precisely from the contrast to the abject dignitas PAULUS DIACONUS asserts the obligations arising from the dignitas humanae originis. But this goes back to the fact that God has condescended to create man with his own hands, namely plenum atque perfectum, habentem in se et dignitatem qua praecelleret, et potestatem qua cunctis animantibus imperaret, soliserviens illia quo ei cuncta fuerant subjugata, ut imperaret mundo, serviret Deo (full and perfect, having in himself both the dignity with which he excelled, and the power with which he commanded all living beings, serving only those to whom all things were subject to him, that he might rule the world, and serve God). The same dignity that authorises man's dominion over the rest of creation also imposes on him the duty to serve God, since it derives from God. JOHN SCOTUS ERIUGENA distinguishes with equal rigour between the state before and after the Fall and believes that the true nature of man cannot be recognised in the latter, which is largely characterised by sensuality. Rather, we should realise that this true nature ad imaginem Dei priusquam peccaret condita est and that since then omnem sensum corporum, omnemque mortalem cogitationem pro ineffabili naturae dignitate ... fugit (but as [human nature] was established before the Fall in the Image of God, a condition in which she eludes in a mysterious way through the ineffable dignity of her nature every bodily sense and all mortal thought). This means that the essence and dignity of man are devoid of all sensuality, i.e. they are rooted and exist only in the spirit. For, as John formulates it in his (neo)platonic terminology, homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aeternaliter facta (Man is a certain intellectual concept formed eternally in the Mind of God) and therefore he rules over the sensual world non mole partium, sed rationabilis naturae dignitate ([for the soundest reason teaches us in no uncertain way that man is one, and in his unity a greater One than the whole visible world,] not by the bulk of his parts but by the dignity of the harmony of his rational nature)¹².

On the threshold of scholasticism, ANSELM OF CANTERBURY points out with equal emphasis that, after the fall into sin, man distanced himself far from a prima conditionis humanae dignitate and thereby not only humiliated himself but also offended God; for secundum dignitatem operis laudatur et praedicatur sapientia artificis (according to the dignity of the work, the wisdom of the craftsman is praised and preached). Although apostate man is no longer the rer of creation, but only quasi regulus, it is nevertheless expected that he will fully attain illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non peccasset (that dignity which he would have had if he had not sinned), anew, both thanks to the sacrifice of Christ, as well as due to the fact that his dignity never completely dies, since it is not least founded in reason and freedom of will and continues to exist with these. In other words, man is an intellectual being, and the expression that he is imago dei says as much. In a Meditatio in which Anselm examines quid dignitatis, quid sublimitatis God bestowed on man on the day of his creation, he explains this expression by means of an analogy to the threefold intellectual activity of God, who remembers, thinks and loves himself. Only if you also, man, Anselm admonishes, remember God, think of him and love him, tuae creationis dignitatem, qua ad imaginem Dei creata es, salubriter exprimas (express the dignity of your creation, in which you were created in the image of God, in a beneficial manner). Service to God and human dignity are thus dependent on each other, since the latter is traced back to God both in its origin and in its nature.

In the same passage, Anselm states that the imago implies a more intimate relationship with God than the similitudo. RUPERT OF DEUTZ also attaches particular importance to this distinction, attributing human reasonableness to the imago relationship and the human endeavour for goodness and justice to the similitudo relationship. However, this striving is only set in motion and animated by reasonableness, which characterises the nature of man even when, as a result of the effects of the fall into sin, goodness and justice are striven for little or not at all. The sentence, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, concerns the entire creationis dignitatem, because it means two things: that God can contemplate himself in man quasi per speculum and that man was given a very special honour through his own creation (faciamus), whereby, as Anselm emphasises, dignitas pulchre exprimitur conditionis humanae (the dignity of the human condition is beautifully expressed). And something else proves the special dignity of man: the fact that the Son of God took on his mortal form in order to redeem him. At this point, however, Rupertus uses the word ‘honour’, whose synonymy with ‘dignitas’ we encounter in several theological texts.

It is easy to understand why theologians with pronounced mystical inclinations are particularly fond of using the concept of dignitas to refer to the incarnation of God, which in a certain sense amounts to a deification of man. In view of God's willingness to seek the sinner everywhere like a lost sheep in order to save him, BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX exclaims: Mira quaerentis Dei dignatio, magna dignitas hominis sic quaesit! (The great dignity of the seeker of God, the great dignity of man thus sought!). The incarnation of God is precisely the most intensive form of this search, whereby even the original relationship between God and man is reversed; now God becomes similar to man, verbum enim caro factum est (for the word became flesh [John 1:14]). Bernhard sees no less a sign of obligatory divine favour in the creation of man by God himself, in order to then derive the dominance of man in nature from the doctrine of the image of God. Like others before him, he distinguishes between the imago and similitudo relationship, regards the former as indestructible (in contrast to the loss of the latter through the Fall) and associates it with purely intellectual factors, such as freedom of will, while similitudo is said to be at work in the realisation of the various virtutes. Although human dignity is based on free will (dignitatem in homine liberum arbitrium dico), it also belongs together with scientia and virtus. All three, dignitas, scientia and virtus, should now have a dual character. Dignitatem... demonstrat humanam non solum naturae praerogativa, sed et potentia dominatus (Dignity demonstrates that the human is not only the prerogative of nature, but also dominated by power); scientia, for its part, should be the knowledge that we possess dignity, and at the same time that this dignity does not originate from us; and finally, virtus should not merely mean the tireless endeavour to actualise similitudo with the Creator, but just as much the adherence to the goal of this endeavour, if one achieves it. It follows from these provisions that dignity without the double knowledge of it is useless or even harmful. For if man knows nothing of its existence in himself, he has nothing of its splendour; if, on the other hand, he knows of it without taking note of its divine origin, he has gloriam, sed non apud Deum (glory, but not with God); in other words, he falls into diabolical hubris. Why, on the other hand, scientia without virtus damnabilis is obvious. The edifying conclusion is this: homo virtutis, cui nec damnosa scientia, nec infructuosa dignitas manet, clamat Deo et ingenue confietur:… Nil nobis, o Domine, de scientia, nil nobis de dignitate tribuimus; sed tuo totum, a quo totum est, nomini deputamus (a man of virtue, for whom knowledge is not harmful, nor dignity unfruitful, calls on God and confesses sincerely: ... O Lord, we attribute nothing of knowledge, nothing of dignity to ourselves, but acknowledge all as yours, from whom all comes).

The example cited illustrates the roundabout way in which the theological concept of dignitas could ultimately be interpreted in the interests of God or the Church. Dignity was an obligatory gift from God and was intended to remind man of his dependence on God at the very moment when he saw himself placed above all other beings thanks to this very dignity. According to a formulation by HUGH OF ST. VIKTOR: Et homo factus est ut Deo serviret propter quem factus est, et mundus factus est ut serviret homini propter quem factus est (and man was made to serve God for whom he was made, and the world was made to serve man for whom he was made). In other words: sub Deo fuit homo conditione, supra mundum dignitate (Man was under God in condition, above the world in dignity). If man is imago of God by virtue of his reasonableness, he is similis to it for this reason, quod sicut Deus hominibus, ita homo animalibus dominatur (that as God has dominion over men, so man has dominion over animals). However, so that he remains aware of the fact that he has at least partially given up dignitatem propriam by peccatum, he has been deprived of dominion over the largest and smallest animals, and now only has the medium-sized ones at his disposal. The continued existence of the imago relationship to God at least guarantees man's return to his original dignity; the concept of man as a microcosm, who through his body synoptically represents nature and the four elements that make it up, and through the faculties of his mind the three persons of the Godhead, also has an encouraging effect. The same glorification of man in one breath with the gloomy description of his present condition is found in PETRUS LOMBARDUS. Tanta ... est hominis dignitas, quo homo legatur sedere ad dextram Dei, non angelus ... Ipse est unigenitus Dei, qui est imago Dei genita, non creata secundum quod Deus (such is the dignity of man that he is commanded to sit at the right hand of God, not an angel. He is the only begotten of God, who is the image of God begotten, not created according), he writes, and then says: qui exterius formam hominis habet, intus imaginem Dei servet (he who outwardly has the form of man, inwardly preserves the image of God). Nevertheless, he adds, the Fall cancels this hominis dignitatem; man ceases to be what he was, and he no longer deserves even this name: exutus autem coelestis imaginis ornamento, etiam nomen hominis amittis (but stripped of the ornament of the heavenly image, you lose even the name of man).

ALBERTUS MAGNUS limits himself to an aphoristic summary of the theological understanding of dignity: Dignitas non potest esse nisi in ratione, dignitas est ea parte animae quae ad imaginem Dei est (Dignity can only exist in reason; dignity is that part of the soul which is in the image of God), whereby freedom of will is considered the most important testimony of the imago relationship. The two other renowned theologians of his century, his pupil Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, however, undertake a detailed discussion of the concept of dignity, using their philosophical instruments. In BONAVENTURE, the connection between the concept of dignity and the concept of ‘person’ is striking: Persona de sui ratione dicit suppositum distinctum proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente (a person of his own account says a supposition distinct from the property pertaining to his position). However, the term ‘person’ includes not only dignitas, but also singularitas as the result of an individuatio, in which matter as the author of existence and form as the author of essence are involved. Here, matter is only the causa sine qua non (the cause without which it wouldn’t be) of individuation, not autem sicut tota causa (but not as the whole cause). For the causa of the person, thus also of dignitas, is the form: nec tamen ita potest attribui materiae personalis discretio, sicut individuatio, propter hoc quod dicit dignitatem, quae principalius respicit formam (nor, however, can such a personal discretion be attributed to matter, as individuation, for the reason that he says dignity, which mainly regards the form). This separation of the person and their dignity from matter represents the flip side of their self-evident connection to reason and rationality: in rationali autem creatura reperiri potest unitas, et personalis dignitas et expressa conformitas (but in the rational creature can be found unity, and personal dignity and expressed conformity). Finally, Bonaventure also represents the topos that the core of human rationality and dignity lies in free will.

THOMAS AQUINAS partly recapitulates, partly explains and partly expands on all the leitmotifs of the theological understanding of dignity described so far. He arrives at the connection between dignitas and persona after defining the latter as follows: persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia (a person is an individual substance of a rational nature). But every substance represents a particular union of the general and the particular, and person means nothing other than the specific way in which the particular asserts itself within the substantiae rationales (whose principal characteristic is self-activity). In the circle of rational substances, person represents the same thing that the terms subsistentia, res naturae and substantia mean with respect to the whole genus of substances; person is thus quod per se existit, quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, quod supponitur accidentibus (that which exists by itself, that which underlies some common nature, that which underlies the accidents). From this it follows that the person is related to «forma» as principium subsistendi and not to «materia», which is principium substandi, which confirms its definition as rationalis and substantia and moreover implies that God himself is only the perfect person. Thomas now transfers the socio-political usage, according to which everyone who is in office and dignity (i.e. possesses dignitas) is called a person, to the spiritual and moral realm and, at the same time following on from the older definition of persona as hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente (hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity), arrives at the conclusion: Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona (And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a person).

The close interweaving of dignitas and rationality or free will is directly addressed in several passages. For Thomas, this is the image of God, the bearer of which is precisely the spirit in man: homo dicitur imago dei non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem (Man is called to the image of God, not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind). Although all creatures exhibit some kind of similitudo with God, similitudo per modum imaginis can only take place in rational beings. This kind of similitudo, the divinae dignitatis similitudo, is of course a sign of special divine favour, which incidentally was solemnly demonstrated for the second time in the incarnation of God. However, the incarnation of God has not only a negative reason, namely the fall into sin and the resulting necessitas of redemption, but also a positive one, i.e. the special receptivity of the human to the divine guaranteed by the existence of dignitas. Thomas wants to safeguard himself against the possible hubris or the assertion that God would take on human form even without the Fall by distinguishing between capacitas naturae secundum potentiam naturalem and secundum potentiam oboedientiae (the capacity of nature according to the natural power and according to the power of obedience): only in this latter way is there capacitas hujus dignitatis in man, ut in unitatem divinae personae assumatur (the capacity of this dignity in man, to be assumed into the unity of the divine person). It must never be forgotten: homo ... peccando descendit a dignitate suaе naturae (Man ... by sinning descends from the dignity of his nature). Nevertheless, dignitas remains the driving and elevating force: ad modum et dignitatem hominis pertinet quod ad divina elevetur (It belongs to the manner and dignity of man that he be raised to the divine). As will be explained later, this is only possible per quodcumque beneficium gratiae, but Thomas has no doubt that, thanks to divine misericordia, man will (re)attain his pristinam dignitatem, indeed his perpetuam dignitatem.

III. The socio-political use of 'dignitas' and 'dignity' until the dissolution of the societas civilis. 

With regard to the socio-political use of the concept of dignitas or dignity (würde), two basic facts should be noted. Firstly, this usage is closely linked to the legal conception of the societas in its ideological foundation, and therefore it remains largely stable as long as the socio-political standards of the societas civilis are decisive or at least effective. Shifts and differentiations can be traced back to the pressure that the emerging modern state, first in the form of absolutism and later in the form of revolution, exerted on the societas civilis and its ideology until it displaced them — and with them the socio-political use of the concept of dignitas or dignity — forever. Secondly, there are no relationships or transitions between the (theological or philosophical-)anthropological and the socio-political use of the concept of dignitas or dignity. Both terms are used as if we were talking about two completely different things, although we are talking about the same word. One can surmise why this had to be: the anthropological concept of dignitas or dignity is at least potentially egalitarian, while the socio-political concept remains bound to gradations and hierarchies and is intended to be an unmistakable reminder of this. There are thus two fundamentally different levels, which could be juxtaposed (for example, when the frequent discrepancy between the moral and social dignity of a person of high standing was pointed out in a socially critical manner), but could not be logically reconciled. And yet a mediation between the two levels was necessary in order to legitimise the structure of the societas civilis, namely to show that the distance or even opposition of anthropologically and socio-politically understood ‘dignitas’ did not give the lie to the assumed divine origin and sanction of the hierarchical structure of the societas civilis.

In view of the aforementioned heterogeneity of the anthropological and socio-political concept of dignitas or dignity, this mediation could only be achieved with the help of another concept. In THOMAS, the socio-political concept of dignitas is closely linked to the Aristotelian concept of iustitia distributiva, according to which diversis personis diversa tribuuntur secundum proportionem ad dignitates personarum (For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity)¹³. Although, as Thomas explains in the same passage, this concept of justice should have nothing to do with an acceptio personae, its objective function was nevertheless to preserve the general (Christian) postulate of equality and at the same time (precisely by interpreting this postulate in terms of iustitia distributiva) 92 to legitimise the existing hierarchical order. For although dignitas status non sanctificat hominem, still comes tota dignitas et virtus ministrorum... a deo 94. Moreover, it does not mean mere sight, but also tangible power. Thomas refutes the view: sicut hominibus in dignitate constitutis debetur honour et cultus, ita etiam eis qui excellunt scientia et virtute (just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue), as follows: aliquis ex hoc quod est in aliqua dignitate constitutus, non solum quamdam status excellentiam habet, sed etiam quamdam potestatem gubernandi subditos ... Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet perfectionem scientiae vel virtutis, non sortitur rationem principii quantum ad alios, sed solum quamdam excellentiam in se ipso (By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects … On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.). Finally, Thomas reminds us of the splendour and significance of medieval representation: diversae dignitates diversa signa habent, nullus autem signum propriae dignitatis dimittere debet etc. (For different positions [=ranks, dignities] have different standards. But no one should let go of the signs of his own dignity).

Not only the connection between socio-political dignitas and iustitia distributiva, but also the distinction between dignitas and the concrete person of the dignitary served the task of interpreting away social grievances and legitimising the existing social hierarchy. Thus, it was explicitly used to substantiate the thesis that personal weaknesses of spiritual or secular dignitaries would in no way release them from the duty to render the same obedience, since obedience was not to the person, but to the dignitas they possessed. Furthermore, this distinction served as an additional confirmation of a principle of the societas civilis' view of law, namely that law was not a creation or creation of human will, but an immutable part of the divine-natural order and that, accordingly, the dignitary represented higher authorities and principles that were above his own person and which he served. The dignitas is immortal precisely because its essence is founded in this eternal order, i.e. it is removed from the contingency and finiteness of its respective bearer. BALDUS therefore believes that dignitas is immortal because it does not refer to the persona personalis (, but rather to the persona idealis, quae est dignitas¹⁴. DAMASUS also contrasted the immortality of dignitas understood in this way with the mortality of human individuals: dignitas nunquam perit, individua vero quotidie pereunt (dignity never perishes, but individuals perish every day). Because dignitas does not die, its successive holders can be regarded as a single person: praedecessor et successor... pro una persona intelliguntur, quia dignitas non moritur (predecessor and successor... are meant for one person, because dignity does not die), wrote BERNHARD OF PARMA. All this applied in principle to dignitas in general, i.e. also to any particular dignitas qua dignitate. Understandably, however, it was said with greater emphasis when it came to the two most powerful and permanent dignitates of the civitas christiana, namely the papacy and the empire. As BALDUS¹⁵ put it: Imperator in persona mori potest; sed ipsa dignitas, seu imperium, immortalis est, sicut et summus pontifex moritur, sed summus pontificatus non moritur¹⁶ (The emperor in his person may die, but the Dignity itself, or imperium [=command], is immortal, just as the supreme pontiff dies, but the supreme pontificate does not die). Similarly, the continuity of the empire was still justified in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, the distinction between dignitas and the person of the dignitary, especially with regard to the pope and emperor, could not be taken too far; since dignitas could only become visible and effective through a concrete person, the complete theoretical degradation of the latter would impair the legitimisation of their socio-political activity. A theological-Christological casuistry therefore developed, the aim of which was to prove the active presence of the divine and eternal in the earthly and transient, giving rise to the view that the rex was instrumentum dignitatis. It is precisely this new subjugation of the dignitary to dignitas that shows how indispensable the distinction between the two was. And precisely because this distinction arose from the basic premises of the societas civilis conception of law, according to which no earthly lord could make law according to his own sovereign will ex nihilo, it was called into question by the absolutist representatives of divine right, who tended to drastically reduce the distance between the person and dignitas of the monarch from the end of the 16th century at the latest.

Perhaps even more important for the structure and history of the socio-political concept of dignitas than the distinction between dignitas and the person of the dignitary is the distinction between ‘dignitas’ and ‘officium’. It takes two forms that indicate two different historical epochs, the former of which is characterised by the social scale of values of the societas civilis, while the latter is under the continuously growing and ultimately decisive influence of modern statehood. While the hierarchy of offices in the modern state is independent, i.e. it does not have to correspond to the social hierarchy, a far-reaching correspondence between the hierarchy of offices and the social hierarchy is considered obvious, even self-evident, on the basis of the ideas prevailing in the societas civilis. Violations of this correspondence by the prince were condemned particularly harshly by the ruling upper class of the societas civilis. Therefore, the distinction between ‘dignitas’ and ‘officium’ here does not have the (modern) sense that a person's social position and official capacity or activity are not necessarily related to each other, but on the contrary, it means that dignitas is more extensive than officium and that the former is strengthened by the officium, but is not absorbed into it; for the noble lord himself confers on the officium something of the innate social dignity of his rank and vice versa: by exercising an officium he confirms that dignity. The office could therefore not be understood in a modern, rational or even merely administrative sense because of its intertwining with an independent and differently legitimised dignity. This is vividly demonstrated at the highest level of dignitates, at the level of regia or imperatoria dignitas in its reference to God. In 1077 (T. N., in fact, in 1074), Emperor HENRY IV (H.R.E.) invokes imperii dignitatem, quae deo auxiliante per nos gubernatur (the dignity of the government, which is governed by us in the service of God). The very close connection between ‘dignitas’ and ‘honour’ should also be understood from this perspective. Noster honor et dignitas, says the same Henry and summarises his governmental intentions as follows: honorem et dignitatem nostram, si deo sanctisque eius debitam veneracionem impendimus, et in praesenti et in futuro stabiliri et ampliari certum tenemus (our honor and dignity, if we pay due reverence to God and his saints, and we are certain that it will be established and enlarged in the present and in the future). However, dignitas, which extended beyond the officium, was not merely meant as a moral authority, but was rooted in tangible rights and privileges on which the organisation of the societas civilis was based. The use of language also bears witness to this, as ‘dignitas’ can mean the sum of a lord's feudal rights over his property. In the ‘Vita Wynnebaldi’ (Hodoeporicon) we read how he was received by Count Odilon magno... honore; magnisque ab illo ditatus erat donorum dignitate in regione, in possessionibus atque in aliis pecuniarum opulentia (with great... honor; and by him he was greatly enriched by the dignity of gifts in the region, in possessions, and in other pecuniary opulence). This binding of dignitas to feudal rights is particularly noticeable in the official ecclesiastical language, which speaks of dignitas in ecclesiasticis beneficiis, quando beneficium habet administrationem rerum ecclesiasticarum cum jurisdictionelle (dignity in ecclesiastical benefits, when the benefit has the administration of ecclesiastical affairs with jurisdiction). The reason for the particular persistence of the aforementioned bond in the ecclesiastical official language may be seen in the fact that a clergyman only acquired certain administrative and judicial competences through his office or dignitas, which a secular lord already had by virtue of his birth. Thus we also understand why the canons tended to identify ‘officium’ and ‘dignitas’.

The second of the above two forms of distinction between ‘dignitas’ and ‘officium’ already emerged in the late Middle Ages. Whereas ‘dignitas’, ‘honour’, ‘ministerium’ or ‘actio’ could previously be used in place of ‘officium’ without further ado, the tasks and duties associated with a public office are now primarily designated by ‘officium’. In the first half of the 14th century, a French legist such as GUILLAUME DE CUNH (Guilelmus de Cugno) distinguished between ‘dignitas’, which makes man a dignicima creaturarum, and ‘dignitas’ in the socio-political sense, which he categorised as follows: Aliquociens dignitas sumitur pro nobiliori et pleniori status.... aliquociens ponitur pro honore pub[lico] (sometimes dignity is taken for a more noble and fuller status.... sometimes it is used for public honor). Social status and status acquired through public office therefore do not simply coincide. A great contemporary of Guillaume, BARTOLUS, said the same thing more succinctly: proprie enim loquendo aliud est officium, aliud dignitas (for, properly speaking, duty [office] is one thing, and dignity another). Vere enim officium ipsum non est dignitas, sed habet dignitatem annexam (Indeed, the office itself is not a dignity, but it has a dignity annexed to it). This implies that the officium has its own dignitas and can generate dignitas independently, without the social status of the office-holder playing a role. It seems as if this connotation also resonates in the German phrase ‘Amt und Würde(n)’ (office and dignity), which became common after the more or less clear conceptual distinction between ‘dignitas’ and ‘officium’. The fact that ‘dignity’ gradually takes on the meaning of ‘office’ can at least be interpreted as a sign of the shift in emphasis from ‘dignity’ (in the sense of societas civilis) to ‘office’ (as a tangible expression of modern statehood). Then ‘dignity’ is no longer something to which the nobility is entitled by right, as it were, but something to which non-nobles can also lay claim. Thus GRIMMELSHAUSEN has a sergeant say: ‘However, I can see that the doors to one and other dignities are kept closed to us by the nobility. Many homines novi who sought their chance in the emerging absolutist state apparatus may have thought similarly. 

At that time, moreover, it was clear that the dignitas conferred by the prince in the form of office was different from, indeed superior to, the dignitas based on birthright or feudal rights. ALTHUSIUS’ classification of dignitates is characteristic of this. After distinguishing between naturalis and civilis dignitas, i.e. between the anthropological and the socio-political concept of dignity, without, of course, establishing any relationship between the two, he defines the two types of civilis dignitas as follows: one, which is regarded as the propria, is a magistratu collocata, while the other, which is aliena... seu natalium dignitas, was ab intecessore parente, vel majoribus accepta (foreign or birth dignity, was received from the deceased's parents or elders) and was to be possessed by the person concerned beneficio ejus, in cujus locum succedit, et quem quasi repraesentat (by the favor of him, in whose place he succeeds, and whom he, as it were, represents). The willingness to accept this latter type of dignitas as dignitas-in-full was, of course, diminished as the social supremacy of the nobility was called into question and the distribution of anthropological, moral and socio-political dignity was perceived as unjust. This was actually an old leitmotif that formed a variation on the well-known medieval juxtaposition of nobility and virtue. Albrecht von EYB wrote in 1511: Wölcher mensch... suchet eer und wirden, der macht sich unwirdig und ist zu verachten (Ahd.: Whichever man … seeks honor and dignity makes himself unworthy and is to be despised). And in Martin OPITZ we read: Kan auch ein hohes ampt mir meine tugend mehren? Wird meiner laster zahl durch würden zugedeckt? (Can even a high office increase my virtue? Is the number of my vices covered by dignity?). At a time of particularly intense criticism of traditional aristocratic prerogatives, the author of the article on dignity in Johann Heinrich ZEDLER takes up these motifs and, after recalling the etymology of ‘dignity’, i.e. its origin from value, demands that both those who are authorised and entitled to confer dignities should not confer them on anyone except those who are worthy, and those who receive them should behave and conduct themselves in accordance with and worthy of this acquired dignity. Thus, the juxtaposition of anthropological-moral and socio-political dignity serves a socio-critical purpose. The author also speaks explicitly of the two different types of dignity; while the one is granted to those who fulfil the duties of man as man, the other signifies a status of honour .... which has been granted to someone because of their exceptional merits by special pardon from the sovereign¹⁷, in prince or by express decree of rights. The only possible source of office and dignity here is therefore the will of the sovereign and the merits of the person concerned, not hereditary feudal rights. And although the office entails honour, a distinction is made between (moral) honour and (socio-political) dignity, because honour can also exist without dignity, but the latter cannot exist without the former. The advantage of birth is at least recognised for persons of equal dignity. Despite the fundamental decoupling of birth and dignity, a certain compromise with the not yet (completely) broken power of aristocratic privileges thus seems unavoidable.

In accordance with the general antipathy of the (more radical) Enlightenment to the theologically biased concept of dignitas (see section V below), the Encyclopédie speaks of dignité only in the sense of jurisprudence. Dignité is thus une qualité honourable... qui releve l'état de la personne (an honourable quality... which enhances a person's condition). The long-established juxtaposition of ‘officium’ (in the state) and (feudally characterised) ‘dignitas’ here takes the form of a distinction between two main types of socio-political ‘dignité’: that which is related to offices qui ont quelque part dans l'exercice de la pouvoir publique, and that which is rooted in the possession de fiefs et des justices que l'on y a attachées, as it has been known since the Frankish period 126. Precisely because the feudal background of ‘dignité’ was still alive, the term ‘dignité’, which still appears in the ‘Déclaration des droits de l'homme’ of 26 August 1789 — tous les citoyens … sont également admissibles à toutes dignités —, was replaced by the colourless ‘emplois’ in [article 5 of] the ‘Déclaration’ of 23. 6. 1793. This replacement has a symbolic value. It makes it clear that the end of corporative society also meant the end of ‘dignitas’ in the socio-political sense. 

In Germany, although there was no revolutionary abolition of dignity as understood by the feudal estates, it was gradually eliminated with the establishment of ‘Amt’ in the field of socio-political terminology and with the restriction of ‘dignity’ to its anthropological and moral meaning. This development can be clearly seen at the lexicon level in the 19th century. In 1811, Joachim Heinrich CAMPE contrasts dignity as an inner merit with its outer merit, especially if it is associated with an office. This contrast, which implies the superiority of the inner merit, is taken up in the short article ‘Dignity’ in the ‘Conversations-Lexicon’. Dignity here is, on the one hand, the absolute intrinsic value which is exclusively attributed to moral beings and, on the other hand, the external splendour that is attributed to individual persons in relation to their civic position. Not only the obviously intended contrasting of ‘value’ and ‘splendour’, but also the fact that subsequently only dignity in the anthropological sense is discussed, with reference to Schiller, testify to the drastic decline in the socio-political use of the concept of dignity. In 1887, the 13th edition of BROCKHAUS Encyclopedia, in the article ‘Würde’ (Dignity), exclusively brings Schiller's interpretation of the term in its juxtaposition to ‘Anmut’ (grace). Although the socio-political use of the concept of dignity has never completely died out in Germany, it has become increasingly unspecific over time; it can be inspired by a nostalgic desire to consolidate the hierarchy of office and social hierarchy in general through feelings of reverence based on the alleged model of the good old days; on the contrary, it can also express distance or irony. In any case, it is no longer associated with concrete socio-political functions or ideas of order.

IV. 'Dignitas hominis' in the Renaissance and Reformation. 

In general, the humanist view of human dignity is characterised by a rejection of the ascetic-acosmic features of Christianity and the associated degradation of the sensual world and the vita activa. This is already confirmed by its first and authoritative formulation. PETRARCA himself understands his remarks on dignitas hominis, written in 1354 or 1357, as a possible response to Innocent III's treatise ‘De contemptu mundi’. He therefore praises the beauty of this world and regards man as an equally beautiful being who gives free rein to his urge for activity in a suitable natural environment. The humana dignitas or maiestas, he believes, is not impaired by the vilitatem originis, the nakedness of man can in turn be made good by the works of his hands. And finally, if animals are superior in various qualities, they must nevertheless submit to human reason. However, Petrarch also draws on the theological topoi of the divine image of man, the immortality of the soul and the incarnation of the Son of God in order to partly justify and partly emphasise human dignitas. The humanist position is thus articulated, both in its beginnings and later, not as an open or conscious polemic against the theological one, but rather as a reinterpretation of the latter or as a shift of emphasis within its framework with the parallel inclusion of secular motifs. In some humanist exaltation of human dignity, however, the normal use of theological topoi becomes a clear preponderance of theologically inspired argumentation. For example, in his short treatise ‘De hominis excellentia’, written in 1447 or 1448, BARTOLOMEO FACIO pays only incidental attention to man's technical and cultural achievements in order to concentrate primarily on the subject of the immortality of the soul. This is because human excellentia should only be fully revealed in life after death, the manifold bliss of which is described in longing detail towards the end of the text. Facio sees other signs of human excellentia or divine favour in the fact that every person has their own guardian angel, that a person (as a priest) can transform bread into the body of God or that he can even (admittedly only as pope) send the sinful to hell and the virtuous to paradise.

The adherence to theological topoi, however, quickly lost its practical significance, not only because of the parallel emphasis on profane aspects, but also because of the abundant use of ideas from the now revitalised Hermetic tradition, which was often mixed with those topoi beyond recognition. It was through the language and symbols of the Hermetic tradition that the new self-consciousness that had awakened during the Renaissance made its appearance, at least as long as it remained merely literary and free-floating, i.e. even before it was harnessed for the practical purposes of the new natural science, which gave it a different linguistic guise, but also a different, purely secular legitimisation and motivation, by the 17th century at the latest. Talk of man as a second God or as a microcosm spread in Italy in the course of the 15th century, while Prometheus or Adam were stylised into suggestive embodiments of upwardly striving humanity. This spiritual atmosphere must now be taken for granted in all authors who devote themselves to the theme of human dignity, although not all of them make equal use of the patristic or hermetic tradition. In Giannozzo MANETTI’s 1453 work ‘De dignitate et excellentia hominis’, for example, the microcosm motif or the central position of man in the cosmos are only touched upon. The doctrine of the image of God plays a greater role, although, as Manetti explains, this refers exclusively to the immortal soul. The faculties of this soul are also defined in accordance with patristics as intelligentia, memoria and voluntas, but Manetti's endeavour to link each of the three faculties mentioned with cultural aspirations and achievements remains characteristic. The reminder that God created the world for the sake of man, in turn, serves to underpin the view that this world in all its colourful richness is the space for the development of the powers of that beautiful and intelligent being called man. The created world, however, only forms the raw material for human activity, to which alone the transformation of nature into culture is owed. In this sense, Manetti writes emphatically, even pathetically, that everything, from houses and cities to plants, animals and even the stars, is nostrum, i.e. imbued with the spirit of the human search for the ever higher. As man is also above the angels, he is only God’s subject, but his obedience to God is not only intended to emphasise the merely derivative character of his dominion over creation, but on the contrary is primarily interpreted as the duty to make life on earth worthy for all, i.e. just. The turn to this world and to the vita activa becomes unmistakably apparent when Manetti sees the rectum et simplex atque unicum officium of man in the fact that he cuncta que in hoc universo tervarum orbe constituta videmus gubernare et administrare cognoscat et valeat. The tone becomes deliberately anti-ascetic when Manetti describes the multiple necessity of the pleasure of life or when he defends the human body, whose beauty and usefulness he praises in extenso, against the contempt of Innocent III.

If in Manetti's work human dignity is based primarily on cultural achievements as the result of a worldly orientation of the active human being, in FICINO's work some two decades later it appears against a broad metaphysical background composed of motifs from the Neoplatonic and Hermetic traditions. The sequence of stages of being, which begins with the inert bodies and culminates in God, is held together by the soul, which medius rerum gradus ist, and omnes gradus tam superiores quam inferiores connectit in unum, dum ipsa et ad superos ascendit et descendit ad inferos (the soul is the middle level of being and it connects and unites all the levels above it and below it when it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower levels). Now it is precisely this soul that constitutes the (rational and immortal) essence of man, who is therefore at the centre of being; and if he is more or less in close contact with the lower grades of it, then on the other hand he ardently desires to rise to his own source, the pure spirit or God. This is precisely what he does, striving to transform himself into everything, to undertake everything and dominate everything, to be everywhere and permanently. The medieval fear of hubris seems to disappear here, as God is no longer perceived as a rein and constant reminder of modesty, but rather as an incentive and benchmark against which human achievements are measured, with which they even compete. The word ‘dignitas’ is used here only once, but precisely in a context that speaks of the enterprising human nature that is averse to any subjugation: superare autem obnize qualibet in re contendit, pudetque vel in rebus minimis ludisque levissimis superari, tamquam id sit contra naturalem hominis dignitatem ([but] he strives resolutely in every thing to achieve mastery and is ashamed to be overcome in even the smallest matters and the most frivolous games as being counter to man's natural dignity). In a diversion from this metaphysically underpinned anthropology, Ficino now arrives at an appreciation of industria in the realm of artium et gubernationis, emphasising that humans are non servi, sed aemuli of nature, and he even goes so far as to claim that human intellect can construct the order of the heavens if only it has the necessary matter and the appropriate instruments.

In contrast to Ficino, Giovanni Pico Della MIRANDOLA is not satisfied with the definition of man as creaturarum internuntium in his ‘Oratio’ written in 1486. The sequence of stages of being dissolves here, and the ontological plasticity of man grows accordingly. Pico radicalises Ficino's idea of the universal character of human nature to the effect that man can make anything of himself that he wishes on the basis of his freedom, both the highest and the lowest; this is his difference from the animals and the higher spirits, who can never escape from their condition. The word ‘dignitas’ is not used here, and the title ‘De hominis dignitate’ was only added to the Oratio in posthumous printings. Pico does not speak of ‘dignitas’ until his ‘Heptaplus’ of 1488, but this time he does not mean human freedom, but as a specific characteristic of man, unde et dignitas ei propria et imago divinae substantiae cum nulla sibi creatura communis comperiatur (hence both the dignity proper to him and the image of the divine substance, since no creature common to him is found), is the fact that he represents a microcosm, namely that he corrogat et counit omnes totius mundi naturas ad integritatem suae substantiae (it strengthens and unites all the natures of the whole world to the integrity of its substance), which should also explain the general sympathy of nature and natural beings with him. While in the ‘Oratio’ the image of God was understood more as the goal of free man, here it appears as the starting point from which people distanced themselves through sin — obliti regni et datae nobis in privilegium pristinae dignitatis (The kingdom was forgotten and given to us as a privilege of our former dignity). Against this evil, Pico recommends that we constantly bear in mind the dignitate constituti we are in and how terrible the consequences of overthrowing the original divine order must be. A retreat into theological positions is noticeable here; dignitas is no longer freedom as such, but rather the preservation of innocence or the image of God, whereby freedom should bring about the decision in favour of — or against — this preservation. Nevertheless, the new status of the human being achieved by humanism itself could not be reversed. This was evident in the pious humanist Juan Luis VIVE’s ‘Fabula de homine’ (1518), in which the microcosm doctrine is combined with the concept of the universality of human gifts and endeavours and, ultimately, man is praised not only as the creator of manifold cultural assets, but also as superior to the angels and the second God

The late reception of humanism in Germany and, above all, the outbreak of the Reformation movement, under whose spell a large part of German humanism fell, stood in the way of the use of the concept of dignitas in relation to human nature. For the Reformation, for polemical reasons alone, had to turn the prevailing theological-Catholic anthropology upside down, and thus to straighten out the two basic pillars of human dignity — rationality and free will — at least as far as the period after the Fall of Man was concerned. But even with regard to the state of innocence, Luther shows restraint when he discusses the doctrine of the image of God. His taciturn exposition of it does not serve to exalt man, but rather to prove that God, in his mercy, had taken care of the redemption of his — despite everything —best work when he allowed his Son to become man. Man's status as the crown of creation is not a source of inherent rights here, but merely a reason for pious, prayerful hope. There is no mention at all of ‘dignitas’ in this context; and when Luther uses the word, he only means the worthiness of man to be rewarded for his virtue, whereby, of course, it is not worthiness per se but divine grace alone that provides the reward. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Catholic or Catholic-humanist opponents of Lutheranism spoke of ‘dignitas’, e.g. Erasmus in a passage where he defends civium libertatem ac dignitatem (the freedom and dignity of the citizens) against the arbitrariness of the prince and associates this dignitas with liberum arbitrium. Nevertheless, Erasmus hardly refers to ‘dignitas’ precisely where one might expect it most, namely in his refutation of Luther's doctrine of the lack of freedom of the will. This was not accidental. In the meantime, the Catholic Church had begun to be suspicious of the humanistic glorification of man, which bordered on hubris: Manetti's book was banned in 1584. In addition, not only the spread of the Reformation, but also the simultaneous development of a secular scepticism, which went hand in hand with anthropological pessimism, contributed to the considerable decline of the concept of dignitas in the course of the 16th century; the 16th century is also known to have been the century of Machiavelli and Montaigne.

V. 'Dignitas' in Natural Law

Partly as a result of the dissolution of the humanist movement, which gave it currency for the first time in modern times, and partly because of its theological bias, if one may say so, the concept of dignitas did not (quite) attain the status it could have had in terms of its subject matter within the framework of secular natural law. GROTIUS does not mention it in connection with his view of rational and social human nature, but rather in passing to emphasise his plea in favour of burial law: proteri tamen ac lancinari corpus humanum, alienum merito videtur ab istius naturae dignitate (however, the human body, to be prostrated and tortured, seems rightly alien to the dignity of that nature). HOBBES, who does not share Grotius’ anthropological premises, cannot define dignity in any other way than as the public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth. In contrast to meritum, dignitas is a moral, not a legal quantity; PUFENDORF admittedly also knows the concept of dignitas as valor or honour in the social and political sense, but he remains the only one among the classical representatives of natural law for whom human dignity in its connection with an anthropology of reason has an almost constitutive function, as the logical development of his argumentation itself shows. It begins with the idea of the rational human being who consciously distinguishes good from evil and is therefore worthy: Ex hoc igitur dignitas hominis prae brutis maxime elucet, quod iste nobilissima praeditus est anima, quae et insigni lumine circa cognoscendas et dijudicandas res, et exquisita mobilitate circa casdem ad petendas aut rejiciendas pollet (The dignity of man above all brute creatures is revealed especially by the fact that he is equipped with a noble soul, which is able to understand and differentiate the things with extraordinary insight, to attain or dismiss them with an outstanding movability). Reasonableness requires the observance of certain norms of moral behaviour; Morality or the exercise of natural law and dignity therefore belong together to the same extent and in the same sense as reason and dignity. Both aspects are discussed in the following section, one after the other and in a complementary manner: Requirebat humanae naturae dignitas et praestantia, qua caeteras animantes eminet, ut certam ad normam ipsius actiones exigerentur; quippe citra quam ordo, decor, aut pulchritudo intelligi nequit. Maxima inde homini dignatio, quod animam obtinet immortalem, lumine intellectus, facultate res dijudicandi et eligendi praeditam, et in plurimas artes solertissimam (The dignity of Man and his excellency above all the remaining animals made it requisite that certain actions should be squared according by some rule; wihtout which no order, no decorum, no beauty can be conceived. Hence it is his greatest dignity that he has obtained an immortal soul, endowed with the light of the understanding, the faculties of judging and choosing things, and with an admirable capacity for the arts). Another fundamental doctrine of Pufendorf's natural law, namely that of human socialitas, is based on the concept of human dignity. The aestimatio sui, writes Pufendorf, may have several causes apart from the instinct of self-preservation — primum tamen eius fundamentum videtur ipsa humana natura. In ipso quippe hominis vocabulo indicatur inesse aliqua dignatio (however, its first foundation seems to be human nature itself. For in the very word ‘man’ it is indicated that there is some dignity). Whoever therefore respects himself as a human being must show his respect for all his fellow human beings, since all come into the world as free and equal beings, i.e. humanity is common to all. Self-respect thus becomes respect for others, mutual respect for all members of society. In this sense, Pufendorf says that the more respect someone has for himself, the more faithfully he follows the leges socialitatis. In their deliberate contrast to Hobbes' construction of thought, these thoughts make clear how closely the secularised concept of dignitas has remained tied to an anthropology of reason. We must note this with regard to its later fate.

In Christian WOLFF's natural law, ‘dignitas’ also plays a not insignificant role, although here it does not have the systematic significance that it had within Pufendorf's construction. For Wolff, no less than for Pufendorf, respect for humanity as such remains the self-evident basis of the overall conception of natural law: Honor humanitatis dicitur, qui homini defertur quatenus homo est. It is then explained what obliges us to this affirmation of honour, namely the perfectio naturalis hominis, qua is distinguitur a rebus omnibus aliis (the perfection of the natural man, by which he is distinguished from all other things). However, this perfectio includes reasonableness in itself, and in fact in the foremost place, yet it forms a criterion for determining human dignity that is more comprehensive than Pufendorf's and is connected to Wolff's metaphysics and theodicy. The metaphysical, i.e. indelible character of the perfectio is implied when Wolff distinguishes between the perfectio essentialis, which man has anyway, and the perfectio accidentalis, namely that which man realises under his concrete circumstances by combining acquisita cum naturali perfectione (acquired and natural perfection). This means that the perfectio accidentalis can only be attained if the perfectio essentialis or naturalis — which is also defined as dignitas hominis naturalis — is always in mind as a goal to be achieved or a norm to be followed: Dignitatem suam prostituit, qui perfectioni naturali, seu naturae suae convenienter actiones suas non determinat (He who does not determine his actions according to natural perfection, or according to his nature, is a prostitute of his own dignity).

With the thesis that all human beings possess the same dignitas, since they are all created equal by God, Wolff now justifies the socio-political demand that dignitates civiles should only be conferred on the basis of merita. The egalitarian concept of natural law, based on the concept of dignitas, is thus opposed to the hierarchical values of the estates.

However, the concept of dignitas had entered into an alliance with (radical) egalitarian natural law demands much earlier, i.e. during the English Civil War, even if this happened rather incidentally. JOHN LILBURNE wrote in 1646 that originally men were by nature all equall and alike in power, digny [sic], authority and majesty, so that the right to rule could only be derived from the free agreement of all those concerned.166 However, this appeal to human dignity was only possible here because the Levellers professed an optimistic anthropology of reason, which differed considerably from the Reformation-influenced view of man held by the other groups of revolutionary Puritanism.

VI. The Western European and German Enlightenment’s debate on human dignity. 

The central concern of the Enlightenment was to establish the primacy of anthropology in place of the traditional primacy of theology. The intended primacy of the human being was not only ontological, but at least equally morally-emancipatory, and therefore one might expect that under these circumstances the concept of ‘human dignity’ would reach a high point in its history. If this has not been the case, the reasons for this must be sought in its theological prehistory or, to be more precise, predisposition, of which, incidentally, the Western European languages are a direct reminder. As a directly or indirectly anti-church movement, the Enlightenment could not overlook the fact that the likeness of man to God was the flip side of the Fall of Man, and it therefore attempted to eliminate both aspects of theological anthropology in one fell swoop. By categorising man in the now ontologically and normatively upgraded nature, he automatically ceased to be both God's image and a sinner from birth. The thesis that man is nature, however, meant saying goodbye to the dualistic anthropology of reason on which the Christian concept of dignity was based — a farewell that had to be accepted in the fight against asceticism, as did the danger of a loss of free will as a result of the (sometimes complete) categorisation of man in the laws of nature. However, the Enlightenment (at least in its mainstream) hoped to find constructive answers to the questions that arose after the dissolution of the theological worldview. Man was now to derive rules of moral behaviour from his own nature, including his sensual nature, and in accordance with it, just as he was to become master of his external nature by adapting it. Despite this hopeful interpretation of the new situation, however, the thesis that man is nature had to instil scepticism with regard to the status of man, namely his objective significance in the causally functioning, intrinsically meaningless universe. This scepticism mingled with the desire to detach oneself from theological anthropology and conceptuality, and both worked to the disadvantage of a broad use of the concept of dignity. 

HUME articulates the ambiguous position (of the mainstream) of the Enlightenment described above in an essay in which he explores the question of the ‘Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature’. He begins by summarising the two extreme views as follows: Some exalt our species to the skies, and represent man as a kind of human demigod, who derives his origin from heaven, and retains evident marks of his lineage and descent. Others insist upon the blind sides of human nature, and can discover nothing, except vanity, in which man surpasses the other animals. Hume does not want to accept either view in this form. The former is relativised by the remark that man may only claim superiority over the other animals, but that he is far removed from a heavenly being as far as wisdom and virtue are concerned. On the other hand, his natural constitution, within which self-love has a key function, in no way stands in the way of moral practice, but on the contrary promotes it. Self-love can be transformed into a benevolent interest in people who directly concern us, and it also serves as a motive for virtue when this is rewarded by social recognition. Precisely because man is a natural being, he can only claim relative superiority for himself. And precisely because he can achieve much as a natural being, he gives the lie to the nihilism that could result from the rejection of his theologically understood dignity.

Hume's reference to self-love is reminiscent of the strong eudaemonic trait of Enlightenment (early liberal) moral philosophy in its connection with a naturalistic conception of man. Since, by contrast, the concept of dignity was traditionally tied to a dualistic anthropology of reason, this may explain the paradox that it hardly appears in the first major Enlightenment-inspired declarations of human rights, in which, among other things, the right to (earthly) happiness is also propagated. An additional, equally important reason for this may be that the terms ‘dignity(ies)’/‘dignité(s)’ were still normal designations for offices in the 18th century, many of which were obtained and exercised on the basis of the privileges of the estates.

If the term ‘human dignity’ was used much more emphatically in Germany than in the Western European Enlightenment, this was due to two reasons. Firstly, a term was available here which, in contrast to ‘dignitas’, was still unused and could therefore be filled with new content much more easily. Indeed, in the course of the 18th century, ‘dignity’ gradually ceased to refer exclusively to the external or internal merits of persons and came to denote certain spiritual and moral characteristics of the entire human species. Secondly (this time in the opposite sense), the peculiar German mixture of more or less free religiosity and Enlightenment ideas allowed a transfer of traditional content into the new concept of dignity, which initially supported it until it became independent enough to support the secularisation of that content and even to combine with contemporary emancipatory demands. However, traditional content refers to the direct link between human dignity and the Creator God and the dualistic anthropology of reason. In 1754, a poem by Johann Jakob DUSCH reads: Zur Seligkeit erschaffen, dem Bilde Gottes gleich,/ betrat der Erden König, der Mensch, sein neues Reich,/ mit Tugend ausgerüstet, vollkommen ohne Mängel,/ an Würd ein Herr der Schöpfung, an Heiligkeit ein Engel (Created for salvation, in the image of God,/ the earthly king, Man, entered his new realm,/ equipped with virtue, perfect without defect,/ in dignity a lord of creation, in holiness an angel). For Johann Caspar LAVATER, in turn, the memory of the dignity of humanity — together with that of the presence of God and, conversely, of animal abomination — should prevent us from falling into sin. God-ordained virtue is thus a victory over brute nature that proves human dignity. As the secularisation of human dignity progresses, the moral aspect in particular comes to the fore in its autonomy — always in connection with a dualistic anthropology of reason, which is intended as a bulwark against sensualist and eudaemonic tendencies. Christian Fürchtegott GELLERT wrote in 1767 that the true dignity of man consists in the exact observation of his duties, whereby he seeks the reason for the fulfilment of duty in sovereign reason: virtue, as true dignity, is and remains at all times a work of the enlightened intellect, at all times a work of free will. The secularised, i.e. now purely morally understood, but still based on a dualistic anthropology of reason, concept of dignity experiences its classical formulation through KANT, namely in the context of the attempt to establish a morality that is universally valid in its mere formality, i.e. free from the fluctuations and contingencies of experience or the sensual nature of man. The moral law can only escape contingency if its general validity results from its form and if it is based on an absolute purpose, an end in itself. It is therefore an absolute commandment, because the mere concept of a categorical imperative may also provide its formula containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative. This absoluteness is formal, however, because practical principles are formal anyway if they abstract from all adjective purposes, i.e. do not take into account personal or momentary inclinations, which are always relative and therefore incompatible with the absoluteness of the commandment. The absolute commandment therefore requires an absolute reference point, and Kant calls man and every rational being an absolute value or end in itself. This addition means that what constitutes the absolute value of man is precisely his reason. Insight into man's reasonableness makes it possible, indeed necessary, to act in accordance with the absolute commandment. In this sense Kant writes that the mere dignity of humanity as rational nature, without any other end or advantage to be attained by it, hence respect for a mere idea, is yet to serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is just in this independence of maxims from all such incentives that their sublimity consists. The principle of the moral agent is the following conviction: Humanity itself is a dignity; for man cannot be used by any man ... merely as a means, but must at all times be used at the same time as an end, and therein consists precisely his dignity. Now because human dignity is so closely connected with man as an absolute end and thus also with the concept of an absolute commandment, it is also absolute, i.e. it is exalted above all price, which has only a relative, while it itself has an intrinsic value. But by what does (rational) humanity in itself become a dignity or an end in itself, what specifically characterises it? Kant's answer is: Autonomy is..... the ground of the dignity of human and every rational nature. Only autonomy makes man an end in himself, for only a will that gives itself laws can also be regarded as an end in itself 183. That man may only ever be an end and never a means means means not least that he himself is the creator of that absolute commandment to which he submits himself: Thus the will is not merely subjected to the law, but is subjected in such a way that it must also be regarded as self-legislating. It is precisely in this that the dignity (prerogative) of man lies above all mere natural beings. In the light of the idea of autonomy, it becomes understandable why Kant says that only morality and humanity have dignity, insofar as it is capable of it¹⁸. Only in morality can the rational being ‘man’ develop his autonomy and thus become an end in itself. But if he is an end in himself, he must eo ipso submit to the absolute commandment, i.e. he must also regard and treat all other rational beings as ends in themselves. Dignity thus has a double dimension and function: it is the motive for morality, insofar as it coincides with autonomous law-giving reason, and at the same time it forms the goal to which morality should orientate itself as the preservation of the dignity of fellow human beings. To use Kant's expression 187: Dignity is both a subjective and an objective moral principle. As with Pufendorf, one's own dignity compels respect for the dignity of others. These thoughts shed light on what Kant means when he asserts that moral laws can be derived from the universal concept of a rational being in general. 

Since Kant's concept of dignity was based on a dualistic anthropology, it was bound to lose its lustre if the latter was not readily accepted. Thus SCHILLER's endeavour to deal with the moral problem in the closest connection with the aesthetic problem on the basis of an anthropology that at least tended to be monistic was not without consequences for the concept of dignity. The difference in the conception of man leads to the fact that — while for Kant dignity means the full development of the dynamics of the rational person — for Schiller it is tantamount to splitting the person into two parts, whereby one part does violence to the other, however praiseworthy this may be from a purely moral point of view. Hence the inferiority of dignity to grace: With dignity... the spirit acts as ruler in the body... whereas with grace it rules with liberality... Grace... lies in the freedom of the voluntary movements; dignity in the mastery of the involuntary, i.e. purely instinctive and sensually conditioned. But since the ideal of perfect humanity does not demand conflict, but harmony between the moral and the sensual, it is not compatible with dignity, which, as an expression of that conflict between the two, reveals either the particular limits of the subject or the general limits of humanity. The unnatural division of man causes suffering, which is to be endured with decency for the sake of moral purpose: And in this way now, tranquillity in suffering, as what dignity actually consists in, becomes a representation of the intelligence in man and an expression of his moral freedom. In other words, mastery of the instincts through moral power is freedom of mind, and dignity is its expression in appearance. The highest degree of dignity as appearance is majesty (this holds before us a law that compels us to look within ourselves); at the same time, however, dignity, precisely because it is appearance, can degenerate into empty gravity.

Schiller also uses the concept of dignity with regard to the specific spiritual and moral merits of the human species as such. The dignity of mankind is given into your hands, he calls out to the artists, after he had sketched a portrait of man at the end of the century (1788/89) at the beginning of the same poem. He should be the most mature son of the age, free through reason, strong through laws… master of nature and above all the sole creator and enjoyer of art. But if the dignity of humanity is so closely related to art, as Schiller understands the latter, then it can hardly coincide with dignity in the sense of the Spartan habitus. W. V. HUMBOLDT too, especially at the time of his strong influence by Schiller, was not prepared to equate the dignity of humanity with dignity in the sense of sovereign rigour against sensuality, and he therefore demanded that spiritual dignity should appear in the guise of sensual grace. However, like Schiller, he did not dare to carry his monistic approach through to the end. For fear of the possible unpredictable outbursts of sensuality, the superior guiding reason also remained the final decision-making authority for him. Through it alone [i.e. moral strength] man attains true dignity, he had already written in 1789, after he had declared spiritual nature to be that which actually makes Man ... Man.

Regardless of how dignity was evaluated, there was agreement that it presupposed a dualistic anthropology of reason. FICHTE emphasised this following Kant. Through the victory over the blind causality of sensuality and instincts we attain a dignity … that is elevated above all nature. In other places, mere enjoyment is contrasted with the dignity due to reason. However, this rule of reason is synonymous with the autonomy of the (pure ego of the) human being. Our entire humanity and dignity, according to Fichte, is determined by the sense of self, which evokes and keeps alive the autonomy or the strict and sharp distinction of our pure self from everything that is not ourselves. The same fact results from the coupling of dignity and freedom of will. In addition, Fichte develops a dialectic of individual dignity and the dignity of the human species, the concrete and comprehensive realisation of which he has in mind as the goal of historical progress. Progress in itself, interpreted as the possibility of perfection, is already an indispensable component of the true dignity of humanity: for the essence of reason consists in progressing towards the infinite. A finite, limited reason is no reason. For its part, historical progress should proceed by the fact that the individual, although he is an end in himself, must at the same time be regarded as a means of realising reason. This is the ultimate end of his existence, for this alone is he there... Thus the dignity of humanity is not diminished but elevated. Each alone is charged, before his self-consciousness, with the achievement of the overall purpose of reason. The dignity of man thus also includes the endeavour to establish a socio-political order that corresponds to his innate dignity. Because, e. g., the purest love of truth, for its own sake, and the deepest feeling of our own high dignity belong together, a constitution that would stand in the way of the free exploration of truth could not be accepted, since here people would lose their dignity as free spirits. Fichte's remarks on the dignity of women and the lower classes are also to be understood within the framework of these socio-political implications of the concept of dignity.

At a time when he was philosophically close to Kant and Fichte, the young HEGEL expected critical philosophy to provide irrefutable proof and practical promotion of the cause of human dignity. One will be dizzy at this highest height of all philosophy, by which man is so greatly elevated; but why did it come so late to raise the dignity of man, to recognise his capacity for freedom, which places him in the same order as all spirits? I believe it is no better sign of the times than this, that mankind is represented as so worthy of respect in itself; it is a proof that the nimbus around the heads of the oppressors and gods of the earth is disappearing. The philosophers prove this dignity, the people (Völker) will learn to feel it. Here it is indeed expressed in what human dignity is rooted: in the capacity of freedom and in the pure spirituality of man, whereby Kantian terms are also alluded to. But even much later, when Hegel subjected Kant's morality to a rigorous critique, he could see in dignity nothing other than the autonomy founded in the spirit, especially against the blind instinct: Man has dignity not by what he is as an immediate will, but only by knowing of something that is in and for itself (An- und Fürsichseienden), something substantial, and by subjecting his natural will to it and making it conform. This makes it clear how deep and lasting Kant's influence on the understanding of human dignity was at the time of German Classicism. 

The connection between dignity and emancipatory postulates, which we already encountered in Fichte and also echoes in the quoted statement by the young Hegel, occurs frequently in German literature after 1789. For SCHUBART, the French Revolution was a step towards the establishment of human dignity, while Christoph Martin WIELAND, who rejected the radical-democratic current within it and above all its political methods, nevertheless agreed with a defender of pure democracy insofar as he recognised that the Revolution produced men who, imbued with a deep sense of human dignity fused with their self-awareness, love freedom above all else as a necessary condition of it and the republic as the only form of government appropriate to it. SCHLEIERMACHER referred to the dignity of mankind in his attempt to renew religion. And at a time when F. SCHLEGEL still believed in the necessary infinite perfection of humanity and that pure humanity... was only one and the same, without all parts, he praised a democrat like Forster as follows: A living concept of the dignity of man is, as it were, everywhere present in his writings. Against those, in turn, who looked down contemptuously on the masses and their capacity for education, he took up arms with these words: ‘He who remains indifferent and lazy here cares nothing for the dignity of art and humanity. Finally, the use of the concept of dignity in connection with the claim to material and thus also social independence of the intelligentsia, which was just forming on a broad basis and seeking its living space in the emerging free market of the intellect (new bourgeois audience, expansion of the publishing industry), is remarkable. In GOETHE'S retrospective: But now the time was to come for poetic genius to become self-conscious, to create for itself its own circumstances, and understand how to lay the foundation of an independent dignity.

VII. The degradation and revival of the concept of dignity in the 19th century. 

The degradation of the concept of dignity in Germany during the period that followed the dissolution of classical idealist philosophy, accompanied the demise of the dualistic anthropology of reason, partly as a result of the spread of materialistic views (from Feuerbach and Marx to the vulgar materialism of the 1860s and 1870s) and partly as a result of the utilitarian-functional or even social Darwinist view of the moral phenomenon, which was at least indirectly linked to the development of the sociological discipline and which in turn was based on a more or less naturalistic view of human beings. The interdependence of the rejection of the dualistic anthropology of reason and the disparagement of the concept of dignity is clearly evident in SCHOPENHAUER, who prefaces his critique of Kant with a principle of his philosophy, namely that reason, like the cognitive faculty in general, is something secondary and appertaining to the phenomenon, in fact something conditioned by the organism, whereas the real kernel … in Man is his will. After pointing out the theological origin of essential aspects of Kant's ethics, he criticises the fact that Kant transfers the theoretical primacy of reason to practical philosophy without further ado and thus arrives at a purely formal morality that is devoid of any anthropological justification, i.e. of all concrete driving forces of action. Autonomy in the sense of the absence of any personal interest in moral action is therefore a fiction, from which Kant derives the dignity of man as his own legislator. This would at least stand as an embellishment of Kant's moral system. But this expression ‘dignity of man’, once uttered by Kant, afterwards became the shibboleth of all clueless and unthinking moralists, who hid their lack of a real, or at least of any meaningful foundation of morality behind that impressive expression ‘dignity of man’, cleverly reckoning that their readers would also be pleased to see themselves invested with such a dignity and would therefore be satisfied with it. In addition, Schopenhauer finds Kant's definition of ‘dignity’ as ‘absolute value’ contradictory, since ‘value’ can only be a relational concept. But the talk of ‘dignity’ is also tautological in his eyes, insofar as ‘dignity’ and morality are interchangeable concepts. In terms of content, the concept of dignity seems to him hardly applicable to such a limited and fragile being as man — and dangerous at that: for whoever applies the high standard of dignity to man and expects much of him can only feel hatred or contempt for him, which makes him incapable of compassion, the only possible motive for morality. Even more: Whoever acts morally with regard to his own dignity acts directly or indirectly egoistically, i.e. basically he does not want to jeopardise his high self-esteem. Nevertheless, for Schopenhauer it is permissible to speak of a dignity of man when that practical use of reason is present which asserts the actual prerogative which man has over the animal. This practical rationality, however, has nothing to do with virtue or vice, but consists in the mere nil admirari, i.e. in the renunciation of the belief that the possession of any thing would grant happiness, and therefore also of the desire which this belief causes. Dignity is therefore ataraxia, ... the serene endurance of suffering. There is greatness of spirit and dignity in bearing the inevitable silently and calmly, in melancholy tranquillity, remaining the same.

NIETZSCHE thematises the concept of dignity in the context of his cultural critique. Virtue-dignity or European dignity: for him this is an anointed saying or solemn promise, in any case a sign of decadence. Expressions such as the dignity of man or the dignity of labour are among the beautiful seductive and reassuring words of an epigone culture that is ideologically based on an optimistic view of existence without realising that it needs a slave state in order to exist in the long term. When the effect of those words has been used up, such a culture is gradually heading towards a horrific destruction. The provisional function of such conceptual hallucinations, which were incidentally foreign to the Greeks, is therefore to provide comfort (on the side of the slaves) or to evoke tears of pity (on the side of the masters). But warfare alone, as dignified work that has the destruction of ‘dignified people’ as its purpose, shows clearly enough how empty of content and, moreover, how contradictory such slogans are. With regard to this and the like, Nietzsche emphasises the following as the most general sign of modern times: Man has lost an incredible amount of dignity in his own eyes - despite the efforts of those who want to put morality in the place of the now dead God and hold on to the dignity of man with their belief that moral values are cardinal values. Those who have abandoned God hold on to their belief in morality all the more strictly. From the perspective of Nietzsche's psychological method of unmasking, however, the appeal to human dignity also appears as an aspect of what he called ressentiment. It thus does not constitute a purely moral act, and therefore the morality that it is supposed to justify is not to be taken in its nominal value: One protests in the name of 'human dignity' : but that, expressed more simply, is that precious vanity which feels being unequal, being publicly rated lower, as the hardest lot.

The revival of the concept of dignity in the 19th century was primarily due to the struggle of the Neo-Kantians against the utilitarian-eudaemonic and sociological tendencies in the field of moral philosophy¹⁹ - i.e. through the renewed recourse to the dualistic anthropology of reason. Hermann COHEN clearly expresses this connection. It is the I (ego), he writes, which is excluded from the one-sided sociological point of view. The self-consciousness of the individual must be suppressed if the social milieu is to be brought into the right light. This, however, eliminates the main thing that constitutes human value, that constitutes human dignity. The demarcation against eudaemonism is just as sharp. Turning away from all eudaemonism ... is the first step towards positive elevation, towards the dignity of man. For Cohen, this dignity is the independent value of every individual, and its loss is impossible. Leonard NELSON has endeavoured most extensively to renew the concept of dignity following Kant and Fries. Nelson finds Kant's concept of dignity ambiguous in that it signifies both the autonomy of the person and their claim to respect, without the said claim resulting with logical necessity from the fact of autonomy. Fries is said to have justified precisely that which appears in Kant without justification, namely the law of the equality of dignity of all persons. It is not possible to go into the details of this complicated problem of justification here. Nelson at least emphasises the anti-eudaimonic-dualistic background of the concept of dignity. Autonomy and freedom have nothing to do with libertinism, because with the confession of the impotence of reason, man loses his dignity or, to put it another way: Man’s dignity is his capacity for good, it is what elevates him above the animal. Human dignity can therefore also be defined as the cigent drive to fulfil duty; dignity and duty (fulfilment) necessarily belong together. Insofar as the concept of dignity makes respect for the rights of others a duty, it is able to support the idea of law and the legal system; for the dignity of the person is... the condition on which the moral law restricts our actions. In this broad sense, the entire secular culture, which has freed itself from the heteronomy of divine commandments, can be built on the concept of dignity. With the doctrine of the categorical imperative, through which the dignity of man was actually discovered in the first place, the overthrow of the medieval world view was finally completed, says Nelson. Nevertheless, he knows that the principle of human dignity as the basis of modern autonomy and culture is also rooted in a new faith. It is indeed given its determination in ethics, but only in the negative form... a prohibition... to turn the person into a mere means for our ends. It is not up to our will to give the person positive dignity in the first place. We can only recognise it, and this recognition no longer belongs to knowledge, but to faith.

VIII. Outlook.

The neo-Kantian revival of the concept of dignity has not been able to spread to the entire intellectual spectrum. It took place at a time when the aforementioned counter-currents had the upper hand. This ambivalence can explain the paradoxical case in which the concept of dignity is used in a value-neutral way. JHERING, for example, defined it from his social-utilitarian perspective as the exercise of one's own value judgement in behaviour. Another, albeit essentially different, reason why the concept of dignity did not become generally accepted lay in its replacement by the concept of value, which began towards the end of the 19th century, but only became fairly generalised through the so-called philosophy of value from the period between the two world wars. Here, according to a formulation by COHN, the person has value content, it is an intrinsic and self-entitled centre of value. SCHELER speaks of both the value and the dignity of the person and believes that Kant's formal ethics, in its logical connection with an anthropology of reason, necessarily amounts to a depersonalisation of the concrete, concretely acting person, and that it can therefore neither explain nor theoretically underpin their individual dignity and autonomy — quite the opposite: the complete socialist enslavement of the person propagated in Fichte's ‘Closed Commercial State’ is the first state-philosophical result of this more consistent turn of the Kantian concept of the person.

These statements by Scheler mark the beginning of an important turn in the use of the concept of dignity. Its traditional connection with a dualistic anthropology gradually fades, if it is not programmatically denied, and the contrast between the intrinsically dignified person and the totalitarian, inhuman social order takes centre stage. ‘Dignity’ now serves as a counter-concept to the latter. The new use of language was, especially in Germany, greatly encouraged by the experiences of National Socialism, which led to a rejection of older positivist positions in favour of natural law views. The resurgence of the idea of natural law was reflected both in the inclusion of the concept of dignity in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and in Federal German case law. At the international level, the same attitude has been articulated by the explicit mention of the concept of dignity in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations of 26 June 1945 and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 (Preamble and Art. 1)²⁰. Nevertheless, the general commitment to human dignity has hardly been able to attain any practical binding force. Not only do opinions on its content differ widely, so that it can be understood, with BARTH, as the falling reflection of God's honour on man or, with CAMUS, as the activist response to the objective meaninglessness of life²¹, but it is also claimed by almost opposing socio-political orders in equal measure. As a result of this multiple and contradictory philosophical and political use of language, ‘human dignity’ has become an empty formula alongside others.

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLIS

1. I can point to many places where one can further investigate this concept, but a surprisingly interesting thesis I came across was this 2014, 500 page doctoral dissertation on dignity in its theological aspect (with a special emphasis on Catholicism) which cites the Pöschl/Kondylis entry: https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/30660/1/Dissertation-ANTHONY.pdf

2. The text states that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.

3. Paragraph 1700. The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God (article 1); it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude (article 2). It is essential to a human being freely to direct himself to this fulfillment (article 3). By his deliberate actions (article 4), the human person does, or does not, conform to the good promised by God and attested by moral conscience (article 5). Human beings make their own contribution to their interior growth; they make their whole sentient and spiritual lives into means of this growth (article 6). With the help of grace they grow in virtue (article 7), avoid sin, and if they sin they entrust themselves as did the prodigal son to the mercy of our Father in heaven (article 8). In this way they attain to the perfection of charity.

4. In Europe alone: Belarus, article 2; Belgium, art. 23; Bulgaria, art. 4(2) and 6(1); Czech Republic, preamble; Estonia § 10; Finland, art. 1; Greece, art. 7(2); Hungary, preamble and article II under “Freedom and Responsability”, doubtlessly the Constitution with the most references to ‘dignity’; Italy, art. 3 (social dignity); Ireland, preamble; Latvia, art. 95; Lithuania, art. 21; Norway, art. 104 (respect to children based on human dignity); Poland, art. 30; Portugal (dignity of the human person), art. 1; Romania, art. 1(3); Russia, art. 21(1); Slovakia, art. 12(1); Spain, art. 10(1); Switzerland, art. 7.

5. [Translator’s Note] This is reinforced in Cicero’s Letters to Atticus VII.11.1.: “and he says that he does all these things for the sake of dignity”.

6. [T.N.] In the original, “Gemeinwesen”, a term used in reference to the res publica.

7. [T.N.] “Turpitudine”, i.e., turpitude, vileness, is often used interchangeably in Ancient Rome with the word indignitas.

8. [T.N.] In my estimation, the way Pöschl conceptualises maiestas is not as linear as “Souveränität”. In the classical sense, maiestas consists in the expression of the perennity of the Roman populus’ supreme potestas, synonymic to what we would call “independence”; a better transposition into German would certainly be “Oberherrschaft”.

9. [T.N.] Written in the original text is “Dreikaiserjahr” (Year of the Three Emperors) when Kondylis meant “Vierkaiserjahr” (Year of the Four Emperors); the former refers to the year 1888 — drei Achten, drei Kaiser —, while the latter concerns the civil war in the Roman Empire that took place in AD 69.

10. [T.N.] Evelyn Shuckburgh’s translation directly translates dignitatis to rank, synonymous to office.

11. [T.N.] Lit. "(I believe that pleasure) would retreat before dignity. The best reading of this phrase is “Pleasure withdraws, i.e., it confesses itself defeated by those who have more dignity, more value than it.”

12. [T.N.] In 784 D of De Divisione Naturae (Periphyseon), Eriugena adds: For as the holy Father Augustine teaches us that “the soul of a worm is better than the body of the sun that illuminates the whole world” — for the lowest form of life, however humble, is to be preferred by reason of the dignity of its essence to the first and most valuable of bodies — what then is surprising in the fact that all the bodies of the whole world are of lower degree than the sensation of man?

13. [T.N.] See, also, Summa Theologiae, I, 21, resp.: The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank (dignity) deserves.

14. [T.N.] Kondylis, even if not expressly, took this passage from Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 400 f.: «And he, too, arrived at distinguishing two persons in the king: a persona personalis, “which is the soul in the substance of man,” that is the individual king; and a persona idealis, “which is the Dignity.” Here, then, Dignity — the persona idealis — is clearly personified. Dignitas is, like Iustitia, an “ideal” person having an independent existence even in the case of a vacancy, though otherwise she is inseparably attached to the ruler, so long as he lives or rules; she is attached to him as his permanent companion — not unlike an ancient deity, god or goddess, which appears on coins as comes Augustin.»

This book, along with Gaines Post’s Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State 1100-1322, are highly recommended to delve deeper into the concept at hand.

15. [T.N.] Not mentioned in this entry is that, during the Middle Ages, the concept of dignitas was also used in relation to the concept of representation and apparent authority (in a non-comercial setting). This was especially important for medieval (post)glossators of roman law, like the Citramontani and Ultramontani (in this case, the ones “beyond the mountains” were the French, from the Italian perspective, having nothing to do with the later use by French counter-revolutionairies referring to the Pope), but especially Baldus, in their commentaries and interpretations to lex Barbarius (or Barbatius), Dig.1.14.3. The story goes that a fugitive slave (lacking civitas Romana) who rose in the cursus honorum to praetor could not de iure be one, hence he was falsus praetor. The main consequence arriving from this is that moral dignity entails legal aptitude and vice versa.

16. [T.N.] In another passage — In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria —, commenting on Dig. I.9.1 (the precedence of the male over female in the same consular rank), Baldus asserts that, as a rule, “[t]he man is worthier [dignior] than the woman” (dignior est vir quam foemina). The main consequence stemming from this is the agnatic succession to the throne, based primarily on lex Salica.

17. [T.N.] In the original “Landes-Fürste”, lit. “Prince (or, First) of the Land”, a title held by the sovereign — or independent, in the classical sense — ruler of a principality.

18. [T.N.] To better comprehend this sentence, this is the full paragraph in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:435: Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.

19. Note from the original: It was precisely the socialist movement's proximity to such tendencies that prevented a broad use of the concept of dignity to underpin its (social) ethical demands. In socialist literature, the concept of dignity appears rather marginally.

20. [T.N.] More recently, in 2000, the first article of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaims that ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected’. Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon has a similar provision.

21. Note from the original: La seule dignité de l'homme: la révolte tenace contre sa condition, la persévérance dans un effort tenu pour stérile. (The only dignity of man: the tenacious revolt against his condition, the perseverance in an effort considered sterile.)